NST IB Psychology

Emotion and motivation – 2

Concepts of motivation; psychological mechanisms for action

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Thursday 4, Saturday 6, Tuesday 9 March 2004; 11am Physiology Lecture Theatre 3







Kubrick (1999): 'Eyes Wide Shut'



Demme (2001): 'Blow'

Theories of motivation

Maslow's 'hierarchy of needs' — not very helpful

Self-

actualisation Realising one's full potential 'becoming everything one is capable of becoming'.

Aesthetic needs

Beauty – in art and nature – symmetry, balance, order, form.

Cognitive needs Knowledge and understanding, curiosity, exploration, need for meaning and predictability.

Esteem needs

The esteem and respect of others, and self-esteem and self-respect. A sense of competence.

Love and belongingness

Receiving and giving love, affection, trust and acceptance. Affiliating, being part of a group (family, friends, work).

Safety needs

Protection from potentially dangerous objects or situations, (e.g. the elements, physical illness). The threat is both physical and psychological (e.g. 'fear of the unknown'). Importance of routine and familiarity.

Physiological needs

Food, drink, oxygen, temperature regulation, elimination, rest, activity, sex.

Maslow (1954)



Manigault (1909) 'The Rocket'

Behaviourism: positive and negative reinforcement



response R \longrightarrow outcome O

If the animal performs the response, is there an "O drive"?

Potentially circular argument: the animal performs response R because it's motivated by O-drive – and we know that O-drive exists because it performs response R...

Even worse: does the animal perform R because it *likes* performing R? Can explain any behaviour this way.

Skinner (1938): define reinforcers by their effects on behaviour. (Can't then say that behaviour alters as a consequence of reinforcement, because that would be circular.)

Positive reinforcers are those things that strengthen preceding responses; negative reinforcers are those things whose removal strengthens previous responses.

Motivational states as hidden explanatory variables (1)



Richter (1927), wheel-running in a female rat



Motivational states as hidden explanatory variables (2)



Motivational states, drives, homeostasis



Homeostasis in action? Sham drinking



Rolls & Rolls (1982)



Rodents that eat all the pies



Hetherington & Ranson (1939); Coleman & Hummel (1969)

hypothalamic lesion; above: mice with *leptin or leptin-receptor deficiency*

Humans with leptin deficiency get a bit chunky, too (1)

8 year-old girl. 1.37 m tall (75th centile). 86 kg. BMI of 46. Mobility severely impaired.

BMI = body mass index =mass in kg / (height in m)². 20–25 normal; >25 obese.



(And another picture of the mice.)

Montague et al. (1997)



Humans with leptin deficiency (2)



BeforeAfter treatment with recombinant leptinO'Rahilly & Farooqi (2003) www.endotext.org

Not all motivation is obviously homeostatic



What's reinforcing?

What's reinforcing?



Premack (1963); Hundt & Premack (1953)

Given a free choice, animals perform some behaviours a lot (with high probability) and others seldom (low probability).

Premack's principle (1963): high-probability behaviours reinforce low-probability behaviours (e.g. if you normally drink more than you run, you'll run in order to be allowed to drink, and vice versa).

Timberlake & Allison (1974): deprived behaviours reinforce lessdeprived behaviours (e.g. if you're drinking less than you normally would, you'll do other things in order to be able to drink more).

Hundt & Premack (1953): the same behaviour can be both a positive and a negative reinforcer!

Electrical intracranial self-stimulation (ICSS)



The mind is its own place, and in itself, can make heaven of Hell, and a hell of Heaven. (Satan, in John Milton's *Paradise Lost*, book 1, ll. 254–5)

Olds & Milner (1954)

Remote-controlled rats (and a cocaine sniffer rat)



Otto *et al.* (2002). *Appl. Animal Behav. Sc.* 77: 217



Psychological basis of instrumental conditioning

Complex behaviour can be unlearned...



The greylag goose. Hard to catch (hence "wild goose chase"). On the right, a female rolling an egg towards its nest.

Lorenz (1939); Tinbergen (1948)

... and we talked about Pavlovian conditioning last time.



Pavlovian (classical) conditioning

Experimenter arranges a contingency between two stimuli (CS and US), *independent* of the animal's behaviour.

CS typically neutral (no unlearned response). US typically biologically relevant (unlearned response: UR).

Animal's behaviour is observed. Does it learn to respond to the CS?

Instrumental (operant) conditioning

Experimenter arranges a contingency between an aspect of the animal's behaviour (e.g. pressing a lever) and some stimulus.

Stimulus typically biologically relevant (e.g. food).

Animal's behaviour is observed. Does the probability of that behaviour change?

Instrumental conditioning: some responses can be goal-directed



Bidirectional control:

1. When buzzer sounds, turn head **left** in order to receive carrot (delivered straight ahead).

2. Now, new situation: when buzzer sounds, must turn head **right** in order to receive carrot.

Behaviour changes. Stimulus–outcome (buzzer–carrot) Pavlovian relationship constant; difference is due to behaviour–outcome (instrumental) relationship.

Grindley (1932). Also rats pressing levers (Bolles et al., 1980).

Omission schedule:

•Tone (CS) \rightarrow food (US), **except** that if the dog salivates (CR), it loses the food.

Dog continues to salivate: this response is under Pavlovian, not instrumental, control.

Sheffield (1965)



after Dickinson (1980)

Goal-directed action



Train rats to press a lever for food A. Give them food B for free.

Poison either food A (group P) or food B (group U).

Test responding in extinction (no food).

If their lever-pressing is goaldirected and they represent the **value of the goal,** then group P should press less than group U.

They do.

Adams & Dickinson (1981)



Stage	Devalued	Comparison	Controls	Change in devalued group
Training	$L \rightarrow food$		$L \rightarrow food$	
Devaluation	$\textbf{food} \rightarrow \textbf{LiCl}$		food	hedonic change
Test 1	L	=	L	
Re-exposure	food		food	incentive learning
Test 2	L	<	L	
Devaluation Test 1 Re-exposure Test 2	food → LiCl L food L	-	food L food L	hedonic change

L = lever LiCl = lithium chloride

Balleine & Dickinson (1991)

Learning that food's value depends on your hunger

	Learning group	Controls	
Train hungry	$L \rightarrow food$	$L \rightarrow food$	
Incentive learning	sated: food	hungry: food	
Test while sated	(L) <	L	
	Have learned that food is less worthwhile when they're sated		
	Learning group	Controls	
Train sated	Learning group $L \rightarrow food$	$\frac{\text{Controls}}{\text{L} \rightarrow \text{food}}$	
Train sated Incentive learning	Learning group $L \rightarrow food$ hungry: food	Controls L → food sated: food	

Based on Balleine (1992)



'Hedonic' taste reactivity patterns (1)



Berridge (2000)

'Hedonic' taste reactivity patterns (2)

'Universal hedonic reaction' — tongue protrusion to sweet substances



Berridge (2000)

'Hedonic' taste reactivity patterns (3)

'Universal aversive reaction' — gaping to bitter substances











Berridge (2000)



'Hedonic' taste reactivity patterns (4): they can alter



The story so far... (2)



Learning the 'incentive value' of heroin





Stimulus-response habits develop after extended training





Adams (1982)

Is alcohol-seeking more 'habitual' than goal-directed?



Dickinson et al. (2002) experiment 2, figure 6 redrawn

Companies may have learned from rat experiments!



Sucrose 'fading' procedure: from e.g.

- 20% sucrose
- 20% sucrose, 5% ethanol
- ...
- 5% sucrose, 10% ethanol
- •
- 40% ethanol









Samson (1986), rats; 1995 saw introduction of alcopops to UK

The story so far... (2)



The story so far... (3)



Cues paired with reinforcement can also motivate

Conditioned reinforcement



Pavlovian-instrumental transfer (PIT)



Pavlovian-instrumental transfer depends on motivational state

Pavlovian–instrumental transfer (PIT) depends on motivational state (without the need for learning)



Dickinson (1986); Dickinson & Dawson (1987a, 1987b)

Conditioning and addiction

Environmental stimuli (cues and contexts) may become associated with the effects of drugs such as cocaine through Pavlovian conditioning. They become conditioned stimuli (CSs).

They may motivate an addict to seek out drugs — cueinduced (conditioned) craving.

> Above photos (and others in following articles) courtesy of Inspector Richard Groves, Community Involvement and Crime Prevention Branch, New Scotland Yard.

Pavlovian-instrumental transfer? Supermarkets

Static advertising, of course, and advertising to children (works: e.g. Galst & White 1976 *Child Dev* 47:1089), but also auditory/visual stimuli:



"Tesco TV is being established to... provid[e]... offers and value propositions from Tesco, its partners and advertisers — where it can be of most value, in-store where many purchase decisions are made... 7 'zones' were identified in-store where programming could be targeted to make the best use of 'dwell time' to create a positive effect for the customer and advertisers... [Grocery, Beers/Wines/Spirits, etc.]...The trial began in 3 stores and its impact was comprehensively researched with Tesco customers... proposed roll-out to 300 stores."

http://www.visagegroup.com/clients-retail-tesco.htm, 17 Feb 2004

Shopping and motivational state



The story so far... (3)



The story so far... (4)



Summary

- Reinforcement must be defined carefully to avoid circular arguments. Theories (Skinner, Hull, Premack, Timberlake).
- Motivational states are internal 'hidden' variables that help to explain behaviour.
- Apparently goal-directed behaviour is complex; several representations/processes contribute. For example, an animal learning to respond for a reward encodes
 - the instrumental (action–outcome) contingency;
 - the value of the outcome as an instrumental goal;
 - the (dissociable) 'hedonic' value of the outcome;
 - direct stimulus–response 'habits';
- ... and is influenced by Pavlovian processes including conditioned reinforcement and Pavlovian–instrumental transfer.
- Motivational state affects several of these processes.

